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Privatization in Higher Education: 
Contracting for Services at Public Colleges and 
U n iv e r s i t ie s
A b s t r a c t
During the Reagan presidency, a wide variety of p r iv a t iz a t io n  
alternatives were examined. Among these was contracting for 
s e r v ic e s ,  an alternative already in use for many years at the state 
and local level. Contracting for services has also been used by 
colleges and universities throughout this country, and remains a 
major focus for facilities managers at these institutions.
Survey data from colleges and universities through this country were 
examined to determine if: 1) the amount of contracting varied by
institution size; 2) the amount of contracting varied by region of the 
country; and 3) the amount of contracting varied with the relative 
degree of unionization.
The results of the analysis indicate that 1) large institutions contract 
to a lesser extent than do small and medium institutions; 2) the 
extent of contracting does vary by region, with the Midwest region 
contracting to a greater extent than the Southwestern, Central, Rocky 
Mountain and Pacific Coast regions; 3) the differences in the extent 
of contracting for services between institutions with non-union, 
mixed, or union workforces was not statistically significant.
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Privatization m Higher Education:
Contracting for Services at PoMic
Colleges and Universities
Section I Introduction
When Ronald Reagan came to the White House, one of his avowed 
purposes was to "get the government off the backs of the people."
One of the tools held out to serve this end was P r iv a t iz a t io n .
Although exact definitions vary, the rubric of privatization covers a 
variety of alternatives for the production and/or provision of 
traditionally governmental services. These range from the more 
radical proposals, including divestiture of government enterprises 
such as the postal service, to the commonplace option of contracting 
for services, such as waste collection and snow removal. It is largely 
on the latter alternative, contracting for services, that this research 
project focuses.
Although the Reagan presidency prompted the examination of a wide 
range of privatization alternatives, their implementation at the 
federal level has been limited for a variety of reasons. Contracting 
for services, on the other hand, has been in use for many years at the 
state and local level. (Poole & Fixler, 1987) Likewise, this 
alternative has been used to varying degrees by the publicly funded 
colleges and universities of this country.
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Current literature suggests relationships between the degree of 
contracting by local governments, and the following variables: the
size of communities, the region of the country, and the degree of 
employee unionization. (Ferris & Graddy 1986)(Poole & Fixler 
1987)(Florestano & Gordon 1980) The underlying assumption of this 
project is that similar relationships may exist for public colleges and 
universities. Contracting for services remains a major issue for 
facilities managers in higher education (APPA, 1990), and 
verification of these relationships provides useful information to 
those responsible for the provision and planning of services, 
particularly if we continue to experience the fiscal constraints of 
recent years.
In the sections that follow, an overview of privatization is presented, 
followed by a closer examination of the issues related to contracting 
for services. This provides the background for an explanation of the 
research undertaken for this project. The research includes the 
analysis of survey data from institutions throughout the country to 
determine if the extent of contracting varies with institution size, 
region, or relative extent of workforce unionization.. The final 
sections include a discussion of the data analysis, and the results of 
the analysis. Finally, the conclusions that may be drawn from the 
data analysis are presented, along with suggestions for future 
re se a rc h .
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Section II An Overview of Privatization
Since the advent of the Reagan presidency, Privatization has 
remained a controversial topic of discussion. Its supporters come 
from a variety of viewpoints. Some are practitioners, seeking ways 
pragmatically to provide governmental services better or less 
expensively. Some operate from a strong ideological posture, seeing 
in privatization methods to reduce the size and scope of government. 
For President Reagan, privatization was a major tool toward that end, 
and one that he promoted though the end of his second term.
(Reagan, 1988) Starr (1989) states that it "represents the most 
serious conservative effort of our time to formulate a positive 
alternative" to the growth of government.
Opponents of privatization likewise have diverse reasons for their 
position. Public unions oppose privatization because of the loss of 
union jobs that may occur. Some public administrators see in 
privatization a threat to their power and position. Other people 
oppose privatization because of the potential threat to individual 
rights, or the possibility that privatization will have a 
disproportionate effect on certain groups, such as minorities or the 
poor.
This section provides an overview of the various issues involved in 
privatization. First, "Privatization" is defined; then the Production/ 
Provision distinction is discussed, followed by an examination of the 
reasons for the growth of privatization. Next the reasons to avoid
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privatization are presented, followed by a review of the types of 
privatization. Finally, the issues related to privatizing production 
are more closely examined.
Privatization Defined
The term privatization is a relatively new word; prior to 1979 there 
was no significant mention of the term in economic or political 
literature. (Pirie 1988) Savas (1987) notes that the term first 
appeared in a dictionary in 1983, with a relatively narrow definition 
concerning a change from public to private ownership. That 
definition was similar to Hanke's: "The transfer of assets or service
functions from public to private ownership or control." (Hanke, 1987) 
Paul Starr's definition more narrowly address a shift in p r o d u c t io n  of 
goods and services from the public sector to the private sector. (Stan- 
1987) Savas (1987) suggests that the term has taken on a broader 
meaning, when he defines it as "the act of reducing the role of 
government, or increasing the role of the private sector, in an 
activity or in the ownership of assets." This definition, while 
admittedly couched in terms that support his perspective, is a useful 
one nonetheless. It pinpoints the controversy of the broader issue; 
the reduction o f  the role o f  government , and the increased role o f  the 
private sector .
For the purposes of this project, however, S tan 's definition is 
perhaps of greater utility, because it speaks to the production issue . 
For the public administrator at the local level, be that a municipality
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or a university, the shift of production to cheaper or better 
alternatives (at the same or less cost) is the real issue.
Production and Provision of Goods and Services
One potential area of confusion in any discussion of privatization can 
result from the failure to distinguish between the p r o v i s io n  of goods 
and services and the p ro d u c t io n  of goods and services. The two can 
and should be quite clearly separated. Kolderie (1986) offers an 
analysis that is useful for distinguishing between provision and 
p roduc tion .
P r o d u c t i o n  is concerned with labor and materials inputs that result 
in some output that is the service or good rendered to the 
community or individual. It's concerned with the equipment and 
facilities necessary to do the work, as well as the management of the 
work. The production can be private or public.
P ro v is io n ,  in comparison, is concerned with policy making, and 
choosing what and how much to have produced. It is also concerned 
with regulation and finance, franchising and subsidizing. It too can 
be public or private, but there are distinctive differences. According 
to Kolderie (1986), private provision occurs when:
1) Private organizations or individuals make decisions about what 
goods and services they desire
2) Having made a choice, they pay entirely from their own funds
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3) Individuals and private organizations choose the producer
th e m s e lv e s
Public provision occurs, in contrast, when:
1) Governmental units make political decisions about what goods
and services to provide, to whom and in what quantity
2 )  The governmental units provide direct financing
3) The governmental units select the producer of the goods and
se rv ices
We have, then, four potential combinations of public and private 
production and provision. For Kolderie these represent a four-part 
topology, which is outlined graphically below.
Case 1 occurs when a governmental unit performs both provision 
and production. An example would be the situation in which a city 
owns a steam generating plant which provides heat for municipal 
build ings.
Case 2 occurs when provision is public, but production is private, as 
when a privately-owned utility provides steam to a governmental 
un it.
Case 3 is the reverse, when provision is private and production is 
public. An example of this occurs in Lansing, MI, where the city
Page 10
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F ig u re  2-1 K o lderie 's  F o u r -P a r t  Topology F o r The 
P ro d u c tio n  & Provis ion  of Services
Case 4 is the purely private case. The GM steam generating plant at 
Buick City in Flint, MI is an example of this situation, in which 
provision and production are private.
Kolderie also notes that there can be mixed cases, in addition to the 
four cases above. For instance, a service could be provided with the 
governmental unit paying part of the cost, and the consumer directly 
paying part of the cost.
Page 11
Privatization in Higher Education: Contracting for Services
In addition, Kolderie makes an important point: even when
production is privatized, the fact that provision is still publicly 
directed makes it possible to maintain the same social commitment 
as if production were still public. (This assumes, of course, that the 
social commitment existed in the first place.)
Pack (1987), in a similar vein, writes that public intervention has 
three elements, each of which can be privatized. Her p u b l i c  
f in a n c e  and pub lic  p ro d u c tio n  elements correspond to Kolderie’s 
provision and production, but she adds r e g u l a t i o n  as a third 
element. D e r e g u la t i o n  is the result of privatizing governmental 
regulation, and this past decade has witnessed a significant amount 
of deregulation.
The topology for service delivery modes developed by Sonenblum, 
Kirlin and Ries (1977) also contains elements similar to Kolderie’s. 
The four modes of service delivery they developed are 1) 
Consolidated, 2) Contract, 3) Regulated, and 4) Grant. Each of the 
modes has three elements that a given actor performs. The elements 
are a) finance, b) planning and c) production. The actors are 
different levels of government, or the private sector. The topology is 
graphically expressed in Figure 2-2.
The consolidated mode, with the actor being either government or 
private, corresponds to Kolderie’s Case 1 and Case 4, respectively.
The contract mode, with the governmental unit providing finance 
and planning (provision) but not production, corresponds to Case 2.
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The Actor Performs:
Mode: Finance Planning Production
Yes Yes Yes
Contract Yes Yes No
No Yes No
Grant Yes No No
Figure  2-2 Sonnenblum , K irlin  & Ries' 
T ypopogy  fo r Service D elivery  M odes
The regulated and grant modes are not as clear cut. The regulated 
mode, with the governmental unit performing planning, but not 
finance or production, leans a bit toward Kolderie’s Case 3. Grant, 
depending upon whether finance is governmental or private, leans 
toward Case 2 or Case 3.
Regardless of whether we are looking at Kolderie's four cases, Pack's
three elements, or Sonnenblum et al's three elements, all clearly 
separate the p r o d u c t i o n  function from the p r o v i s io n  function and
its parts, that is, finance, planning and regulation. This separation is
critical, for it allows an examination of the advantages and
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disadvantages of privatizing production versus the advantages and 
disadvantages of privatizing provision.
Public and Private Goods
A brief discussion of the nature of public and private goods may be 
of some usefulness here. Public goods, although variously defined, 
are typically defined as those goods which are indivisible, 
nonexclusionary and difficult to price in the market place. One 
common example is a sidewalk on a public street: if it is open to one
person, it is open to all, the use by one doesn't diminish the amount 
available to others, and it is difficult to set a market price on one 
crossing of a sidewalk. One of the things that makes it difficult to set 
market prices for public (and private) goods is the extent of 
externalities present. When the cost of an item doesn’t reflect all of 
the value of the good or the resource inputs, an externality is said to 
exist. One common example of a positive externality is public
education, which has a social value that is very difficult to price in
the market. (Bozeman 1987)
Private goods, in contrast, tend to be exclusionary, divisible, and 
priceable in the market. A piece of pie in a private club coffee shop
may not be equally available to everyone, its sale reduces the
amount available to others, and it is easily priced in the market.
Bozeman (1987) suggests that most public goods tend to fall 
somewhere between the pure public good and the pure private good,
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and in fact may be more private in some aspects and more public in 
o th e rs .
The Growth of Privatization
That there has been significant growth in privatization is without 
question. At the municipal level alone, contracting for services, 
which amounted to $22 billion in 1972, grew to $66 billion in 1980. 
Further, it has been estimated that contracting with the private 
sector will reach $3 trillion by the end of the decade if current 
growth continues. (Moore 1987)
The reasons for the growth of privatization are as varied as its 
supporters. Some of the reasons are ideological; some are pragmatic, 
but all have tended to support increased privatization.
The Reduction of  Government
Many of those who support privatization do so because they see in 
privatization methods to limit or reduce the size of government. 
Among this group are those, such as Savas (1982), who are 
concerned about the "hazards of an overly dominant government." 
Others see privatization as a tool to return more control to the 
citizens at the local level. (Armington and Ellis, 1984) Salamon 
(1989) has suggested that part of the support for the reduction of 
government is a "backlash against activist government in the 1980's," 
due to disappointment with the effectiveness and cost of government 
programs. This backlash generated support for various types of
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privatization. For whatever the specific reason, those wanting to 
limit government have been supporters of privatization.
Yet despite the support for privatization as a means to l im it  
government, there are those who suggest that government growth 
has been significant "at the margin," i.e. among the very contractors 
and consultants who work for government. One estimate suggests 
that more people work for government under contract through 
private firms than are employed directly by the government. 
(Sharkansky 1980) Contracting also enables governmental units to 
continue to get the work done in the face of personnel freezes or 
staff reductions. This would seem to suggest that while privatization 
may reduce the numbers working in government, it doesn't 
necessarily reduce the numbers of people working f o r  government.
The Economic Rational
Much of the broad support for privatization stems from an economic 
rational. Bailey (1987) notes that the common thread throughout the 
various concepts of privatization is that of increasing efficiency. 
Government is perceived, even among government officials, as being 
less efficient than the private sector. (Pack 1987) A number of 
elements contribute to the supposed inefficiencies of government. 
These include the monopolistic nature of government services, the 
lack of a bottom line in public service provision, and the self-serving 
behavior of public administrators who lack a vested interest in the 
efficient operation of their units.
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One of the primary dangers of any monopoly is the lack of 
competition. Without competition, there is little or no incentive 
toward efficiency and cost control. Savas (1982) calls competition 
"one of the most fundamental determinants of the efficiency of any 
(service) arrangement," and suggests that the degree of competition 
permitted by a service arrangement is a major determinant of the 
efficiency of that arrangement.
The lack of a bottom line in government service is also of concern. In 
the government monopoly, cost of operation is simply passed along 
to the taxpayer; no profit is lost if the bottom line is not met. With 
no bottom line, there is little incentive to improve, to be more 
efficient. Public administrators have not been able to find a public 
sector equivalent of the incentives for efficiency and cost 
consciousness found in private business. (Campbell 1986)
Another cause of inefficiency that goes hand-in-hand with the lack of 
a bottom line is the lack of a vested interest on the part of 
governmental officials. Public officials allocate resources that do not 
belong to them, in which they have little or no vested interest. 
Compared to their private counterparts, the cost of decisions tend not 
to bear as heavily upon public officials. Public officials can more 
easily engage in shirking behavior because "Taxpayer-owners" do not 
monitor the behavior of public officials to the extent that private 
owners do. (Hanke 1985) Hence, public managers have less 
incentive toward efficiency in their operations.
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Likewise, public managers engage in self-serving behavior just as 
their private counterparts do. They tend to increase the size of their 
operations, because typically a larger department means more pay 
and status. But unlike the marketplace, there are few available 
alternatives to the public monopolies, and the public interest is less 
likely to benefit from the self-serving behavior of public officials 
(Davies 1977)
The "common thread" of proposals to increase efficiency in the public 
sector typically translates as the introduction of private competition 
into government. This takes a number of forms, of which contracting 
is perhaps one of the most common.
The Taxpayer Revolt
The taxpayer revolts in the late 1960's and early 1970's have also 
been cited as a contributor in the growth of privatization. The 
resistance to additional taxes or rollbacks in existing taxes forced 
government officials to find ways to cut back, and privatization 
accelerated at the state and local levels during this period. (Kent 
1987) Poole and Fixler (1987) found that local governments were 
more likely to privatize during time of budgetary constraint. Kent 
(1987) also notes that privatization "works" at the local level, and is 
less costly and is acceptable to the public.
The net result of all these factors was the massive growth of 
privatization at the local level, as noted at the start of this section.
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Reasons to Avoid Privatization
Several authors have presented reasons to avoid privatization.
Written largely from a philosophical or ideological viewpoint, these 
reasons range from concerns about the blurring of the private/public 
sectors, to concerns about the threat to constitutional rights.
P rivate /Public  Sector Blurring
The differences, or lack thereof, between the public and private 
sectors is of some relevance in any discussion of privatization. The 
move to privatize government functions has the implicit view that 
the private and public sectors are alike, at least to the extent that 
both are subject to the same set of economic incentives. (Moe 1987)
Barry Bozeman, in All Organizations Are Public, argues for a lack of 
difference between the sectors. He proposes the notion of p u b l ic n e s s , 
in which all organizations of public to some degree or other. The 
location of an organization on a publicness-privateness dimension  is 
determined by the extent to which it exerts or is constrained by 
political authority or economic authority. Those organizations (or 
elements thereof) that are constrained by political authority have a 
higher degree of publicness. Conversely, those organizations (or 
elements thereof) that are constrained by economic authority are 
deemed to have a higher degree of privateness. No organization is
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purely public or purely private; the key issue "is to determine the 
mix of authority for the organization". (Bozeman 1987)
Moe takes quite the opposite view, hewing instead to the more 
traditional view that "it is in the essentials that they differ, and these 
distinction cannot be glossed over or taken lightly."
For Moe, the single most important distinction between the sectors is 
the concept of sovereignty, particularly at the federal level. Private 
sector organizations do not possess the rights and immunities that a 
sovereign does. According to Moe, the rights and immunities 
ascribed to a sovereign generally include the following:
-The sovereign has the legitimate right to use coercion to 
enforce its will. (Only a sovereign can levy taxes, and impose 
penalties on those who refuse to pay.)
-Only a sovereign may legitimately go to war with another 
sovereign. (General Motors cannot legitimately declare war on 
Japan, for instance.)
-Sovereigns can do no wrong. (A sovereign cannot be sued 
without its permission; permission is not required to sue a 
private person or organization.)
-A sovereign is indivisible. Sovereignty cannot be shared. (The 
American Civil War was fought in part because Lincoln argued
Page 20
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for the concept of indivisible sovereignty and the South argued 
for dual sovereignty.)
-A sovereign may disavow debits but cannot go bankrupt. (The 
right to declare bankruptcy is a personal or private right, 
which doesn't inhere to the sovereign.)
-The sovereign has the right to establish the rules for protection 
and transfer of property, both public and private. (The 
sovereign can take property through "eminent domain;" a 
private party cannot do so. The sovereign also provides the 
safeguards for the transaction of business.)
Given that Moe is correct in this analysis, the sovereignty issue 
doesn’t necessarily proscribe privatization. While General Motors 
cannot declare war, its various divisions can and do provide the 
government with some of the vehicles, electronics and other 
equipment necessary to engage in warfare. Quite clearly one can list 
numerous other functions of government which do not require the 
use of sovereign powers, and which also can be taken over or 
supplied by the private sector.
W eakening  of  Political Accountability
The weakening of political accountability when a public function is 
assigned to a private contractor is also a concern to some. Moe 
(1987) suggests that holding public officials accountable for their
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actions is a "major societal value" in a constitutional democracy, and 
privatizing a public function leads to an "inevitable" weakening of 
accountability. A public agency, in theory, is directly accountable to 
public officials, who are in turn accountable to the voters, but a 
private firm is at best only indirectly accountable to those same 
officials. The result, then, is less control over the work being 
performed, and a lessened ability for citizens to hold public officials 
accountable when privatized services don't meet expectations.
There are those, of course, who would take issue with the notion that 
greater accountability exists under direct government provision.
Savas (1982) notes that those who fear a loss of accountability "seem 
unaware of the difficulty of holding anyone accountable in 
government." Laments about the "faceless bureaucrat" who is 
insensitive to the plight of citizens are common through history.
There are even those who hold that, at least at the local level, 
contracting for services can in fact improve responsiveness and 
accountability to the citizen. (Armington and Ellis, 1984) If the 
citizens are unhappy with the quality or level of service provided, 
they can through their local representative choose to rid themselves 
of the unsatisfactory contractor, and put in its place a better 
provider. This is a situation unlikely to happen with provision by 
public employees. (There several unstated caveats in Armington and 
Ellis's position, the first and foremost being that there are multiple, 
qualified contractors available to step in. If a monopoly exists, or if 
there are significant barriers to entry, a change becomes difficult.
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Also of importance would be a well-specified contract with short 
terms or an escape clause.)
Threats to Cit izenship and Community
Privatization is viewed by some to be a potential threat to citizenship 
and community. Morgan and England's (1988) concerns follow these 
lines: Dramatic changes have occurred in society since World War II.
As economic conditions generally improved, technology advanced 
and mobility increased, people became more concerned with their 
private activities, with a corresponding decrease in concern for 
others and a reluctance to sacrifice for social ends. Local 
government, the dispenser of services social and otherwise, now 
under increasing economic pressure, examines privatization 
alternatives as a means of improving efficiency and effectiveness. 
Increased privatization, with its reliance on the marketplace and 
self-interest, can further erode citizenship and community.
Morgan and England do not take the posture that all privatization is 
necessarily hazardous. They acknowledge that arrangements for 
governmental "housekeeping" activities, such as waste removal, that 
provide greater competition and result in greater efficiency are 
useful as long as equity and accountability are not ignored. They are 
concerned that even contracting this type of service places citizens in 
a passive mode, which doesn't promote the increase in citizenship 
and community that are desired.
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Threats to Constitutional Rights
Privatization can, under certain circumstances, threaten 
constitutional rights. Harold Sullivan (1987) makes a cogent 
argument that some rights protected under the Constitution are not 
necessarily protected when production and/or provision are shifted 
to the private sector. Two doctrines that have bearing here are the 
State Action  doctrine and the State Functions  doctrine.
The State Action Doctrine
The Fourteenth Amendment ensures the right to due process, at least 
as far as actions of the state upon citizens are concerned; but the 
Supreme Court has found, in its interpretation of the State Action 
doctrine, that a private agency is free of the restraints placed upon 
government actions when the agency acts on its own, without 
governm ent partic ipation.
Based upon his review of pertinent case law, Sullivan draws the clear 
conclusion that an individual served by or employed by a private 
agency is not granted constitutional protection, even if the agency is 
authorized or funded by the government, or if its conduct is directed 
by state regulation. Constitutional protection applies only if a 
government official is directly involved in a specific action, or if the 
state compels a specific determination about a specific client or
_______________________________ Page 24_______________________________
Privatization in Higher Education: Contracting for Services
employee. The net effect is this; by privatizing public services, a 
government can avoid most constitutional restrictions on those 
serv ices .
The State Functions Doctrine
It should be noted that courts continue to recognize some 
circumstances in which constitutional protections cannot be evaded 
by privatization. The courts have found that a private agency is 
restricted by the Constitution, just as the state would be, when it 
performs "traditional public functions." (Sullivan 1987) In these 
kinds of cases, the conduct of a traditional public function by the 
private entity is substituted for the conduct of that function by the 
government. As a result, no direct involvement of the state is 
necessary in order for constitutional protections to hold.
As useful as this might sound, however, Sullivan indicates that 
Supreme Court decisions have severely limited the state functions 
doctrine. What has emerged from the Court, through the course of 
several decisions, is a fairly restrictive two-part test that must be 
met before the actions of a private agency are restricted by the 
Constitution. Sullivan summarizes the test in this manner:
First, the power in question is one that has 
traditionally been exercised by the government 
alone, and second, the government must have 
abdicated total and unreviewable control over the
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exercise of the exclusive governmental function to a 
third party. If the government retains some control 
over some elements of the function in question, the 
private party is free from constitutional restraints 
as it exercises its share of what has been solely a 
public responsibility.
The second part of this test is the restrictive one. If the government 
retains any control at all over the function, then constitutional 
restraints apply only to the state’s actions; the private agency 
operates unfettered.
The result of the Court's actions regarding these two doctrines is this: 
when a function is privatized, the private agency enjoys wide 
discretion in its relationship with clients and employees. Neither the 
person being served or an employee of the agency enjoy the same 
constitutional protections they would if the function was still 
performed by the government. Due process in dealing with the 
agency is not necessarily guaranteed to the client. Due process or 
free speech in employment is not necessarily guaranteed to the 
employee. According to Sullivan, if constitutional rights are to be 
protected, than the discretion allowed private agencies when a public 
function is privatized must be severely restricted, else "privatization 
and protections of civil liberties may prove to be mutually exclusive 
goals." (Sullivan 1987)
Page 26
Privatization in Higher Education: Contracting for Services |
Forms of Privatization
There are several forms of privatization. One of the most 
controversial is a sse t d iv e s t i tu re .  Frequently proposed at the 
federal level, divestiture involves selling government assets and 
state owned enterprises (SOE's) to the private sector. Federal assets 
proposed for divestiture have included the Postal Service, Conrail, 
federal power administrations such as TV A, and FHA and student 
loan portfolios. (Seader 1986) Sale of SOE's, while not particularly
common in the United States, has been much more significant in the
United Kingdom through the efforts of the Thatcher administration. 
(Kent 1987) (Asher 1987) One of the perceived advantages of asset 
divestiture is at the same time one of its drawbacks. The sale of an 
asset generates cash flow, and in recessionary times cash can be 
critical. The other side of this coin, however, is the fact that this cash
infusion is a one-time event. The short-term cash flow is traded for
potential long-term income.
L oad  sh ed d in g  generally involves the reduction or elimination of a 
function. This may be through complete or partial withdrawal of the 
function, such as would occur if a city decided to stop picking up 
waste from commercial customers. Another version of load shedding 
is reduced financing, with the recipient of the function absorbing a 
greater portion of the cost. When the county parks systems starts 
charging user fees for admission to park areas, we experience this 
type of load shedding.
Page 27
Privatization in Higher Education: Contracting for Services
C o n tra c tin g  for services is the most common privatization option 
in the United States. In this option, the governmental unit contracts 
with another entity (most commonly from the private sector) for the 
production of goods and services. President Reagan and the 
President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (the Grace 
Commission) focused great attention on the private production of 
public services, but this option clearly predates the Reagan 
administration. (Pack 1987) For example, Kolderie (1986) notes that 
since the 1960's, contracting has been a common part of the growth 
of human service programs. The tax limitation initiatives of the 
1960's and 1970's spurred interest in privatization and contracting 
as a way to reduce costs. Hanrahan (1983) suggests that there has 
been "a decisive trend toward government by contract" since the 
second world war. Despite these more "recent" examples, contracting 
is really not new; it's been around for many years.
Examples of contracting by government abound. One quite literally 
needs only look around to find examples. Traditionally, the private 
sector has been the builder of infrastructure improvements. Private 
contractors have build the transportation and utility systems in this 
country. They have built the buildings in which we conduct 
government and educate our children. In many instances, portions 
of the infrastructure are maintained by the private sector as well.
Contracting for military supplies and equipment has a long, if 
somewhat spotted record in this country. In fact, this type of
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contracting is as old as the Republic. George Washington complained 
about military supply contractors long before William Proxmire 
awarded the first "Golden Fleece." (Sharkansky 1980) In the 
present day, the Department of Defense issues close to 15 million 
contracts for the acquisition of materials and services each year.
(Kent 1987)
Sharkansky (1980) comments that the extensive use of contractors to 
do the work of government is "distinctly an American style." Given 
the American tradition of free enterprise, this observation should not 
be too surprising. The private production of goods and services 
through contracting is firmly entrenched at all levels of government. 
In the next section, the problems and benefits of privatizing 
production will be examined.
Privatizing Production: Problems and Benefits
The privatization of production, particularly through contracting, 
carries with it a variety of potential problems and benefits. In this 
section, the problems will be examined first, along with the response 
of supporters to the various problems. In a similar manner, the 
benefits of privatizing production will be presented.
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The Problems of Privatizing Production  
Mon op o lies
One of the claimed advantages of contracting is the elimination of 
government monopolies. We are warned, however, to watch for 
hidden monopolies when contracting. (Bailey 1987) The problems 
caused by lack of competition in government are equally 
troublesome if monopolies develop when a service is turned over to 
the private sector. The private monopolist will be no more efficient 
then the public one, because inefficiency is "a natural consequence of 
a monopoly system." (Savas 1974)
Creaming
Creaming, or cream skimming, in the context of privatization, refers 
to the situation in which a contractor might prefer to serve the less 
expensive, more profitable portions of an operation, leaving the more 
expensive portions to be served by the government, or not at all. A 
mass transit operation is a frequent example. (Savas 1987) In this 
scenario, the contractor would bid on what some would consider the 
"cream"; for instance, peak time supplemental bus service. Creaming 
frequently has a negative connotation, but in come cases, an agency 
can actually save money by allowing creaming. In this mass transit 
example, money can be saved because the agency doesn’t have to 
maintain extra buses and drivers to serve just a few hours of peak 
load.
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To those who suggest that less profitable portions will be neglected 
by a contractor, Kolderie (1986) responds by noting that the 
government, as the buyer of goods and services, can get exactly what 
it wants. The government can specify that services be provided at 
certain levels at certain times in certain areas. In the mass transit 
example, the "cream" of the peak time supplemental service can be 
tied to less profitable routes, like those with lower ridership or odd 
hours. Even with the less profitable portions of the operation, a good 
contractor can profit, by carefully matching ridership with 
equipment size.
Lowball Bidding
Lowball bidding occurs when a contractor bids the first year of a 
contract low in order to secure the contract, then raises the cost in 
subsequent years when the governmental unit is locked into using a 
contractor. This is a particular problem when there are few 
alternative contractors, or when the cost of entry is high enough to 
keep out most perspective contractors. Possible solutions include 
avoiding short term contracts, thereby committing a contractor to 
provide service over a longer time frame. This could be in the form 
of multi-year contracts with fixed rates, or strict limits on increases; 
but care must be taken to ensure that the contract can be terminated 
if problems occur. Another possible solution is for the governmental 
unit to retain ownership of the core facilities and equipment, thereby
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lowering the cost of entry for new contractors. (Poole and Fixler 
1 9 8 7 )
C orruption
Corruption is a problem far older then the Republic. Indeed, a high 
percentage of the corruption that has occurred throughout American 
history involved contracts between the government and private 
providers. (Moe 1987) This doesn't mean that all contractors are 
dishonest; what it does mean is that the government must be ever 
vigilant, ensuring that noncompetitive conditions do not occur, and 
ensuring that its own officials do not fall victim to corrupt practices. 
Care is required on both the private and public sides, because the 
problem is, as Savas (1982) notes, a symmetrical one, affecting both 
sectors equally.
Transition Costs
The potential cost of transition from public to private production is a 
very real problem, often overlooked. Such costs can include labor 
problems (including possible lawsuits), failure of the contractor to 
deliver a satisfactory product, and the disruption that may occur 
during transition. (Bailey 1987) Careful specification of the contract 
and planning of the transition should help reduce the impact.
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Service Disruption
Disruption of service is another oft-heard complaint against 
contracting; but here too, the problem is symmetrical. Labor 
disruptions can occur whether production is public or private.
(Ferris and Graddy 1986) A strike by public employees can be as 
disruptive as a strike by private employees. A strike by private 
employees can actually be less disruptive if there are multiple 
contractors with different union contracts, or non-union work-forces. 
In any case, the public sector has no special advantage in this area, 
except in those states which prohibit public employee strikes. The 
effectiveness of such prohibition, of course, is open to question.
Service disruption can also occur if a contractor determines that a 
contract is unprofitable, and abruptly ceases operations. The 
problem can be mitigated by having multiple contractors, and 
through careful specification of the contract to include performance 
bonds.
Loss of Scale Advantage
The loss of scale advantage is sometimes listed as a problem with 
contractors. Beyond that statement, however, the discussion is 
largely a matter of perspective. Bailey (1987) notes that efficiency 
through competition is best served by small scale contractors, but 
that efficiency though economies of scale is best achieved by large
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scale operations. He cites as an example waste collection in New York 
City:
Waste collection in New York is a massive operation. As the major 
purchaser of sanitation trucks in America, New York can negotiate 
lower per-unit costs through bulk purchases. They have a distinct 
advantage due to the scale of the operation, compared to a private 
contractor with a smaller operation.
There is, however, a problem with Bailey's example. New York is a 
singular entity; even the other major cities might not have such 
economies of scale. It is most likely that the majority of cities, towns 
and townships in this country would have quite a different scale 
problem. Their scale is limited by the political boundaries of the 
governmental unit, and in many cases those boundaries are too small 
for economies of scale. Here a private firm has the advantage 
because it is not limited by political boundaries. (Spann 1977) (See 
Figure 2-3.)
Residents of a typical township may see an example of this on a 
weekly basis. Household waste is picked up by a local contractor 
who, through the course of the week, sends his trucks to a number of 
cities and townships. The contractor has economies of scale that the 
township could never hope to achieve.
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Township Town Multi-unit Major Metro
Contractor Area
Figure 2-3 Economies of Scale vs. Local Government Size
Community and Equity Problems
Concerns about equity are raised in any discussion about contracting 
out services used by the poor or disadvantaged. One can find cases 
in which the poor were treated less equitably by a contractor, but 
once again we have a symmetrical problem. A contractor can treat 
certain groups less equitably; so can a government. On the other 
hand, if the service contracted out is properly specified and 
delivered, equity can be enhanced, because all people will be treated 
equally well. Savas (1987) suggests that minority groups are better 
served by any service arrangement that actually improves efficiency,
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so to the extent that contracting out improves efficiency, minority 
groups are better served.
Quality Control
Anytime you contract for goods and services, quality control is 
critical. A well-specified contract is required, along with monitoring 
of the work. We are warned, however, that well-specified contracts 
are not always easily written , and that proper monitoring can be 
difficult and expensive (Sappington & Stiglitz 1987) The importance 
of a well-specified contact cannot be over emphasized, for without 
such, monitoring is at best problematic and at worst almost 
im possib le .
Ferris and Graddy (1986) suggest that two components of the service 
output affect specifications and monitoring. These are the
tangibleness and complexity of the product. The more tangible the
product, the easier it is to specify and monitor. Conversely, the more 
complex the product, the harder it is to specify and monitor. The 
relationship is expressed graphically in Figure 2-4.
It doesn’t take much reflection to validate this almost intuitive 
assertion. Clearly a ton of road salt is both a great deal more tangible 
and a lot less complex then the design of computer software for a 
multi-site energy management system. Both require a good 
specification and proper monitoring, but the ton of road salt is 
significantly easier to specify and monitor.
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Figure 2-4 Difficulty in Specifying Monitoring Contracts vs 
Tangibleness and Complexity of Product  
Loss of Control
Several writers express concern about the potential loss of control 
that occurs when contractors are used, particularly for a service. 
(Ferris and Graddy 1986) The core of this concern is the expectation 
of an inverse relationship between efficiency and control. The 
increase in efficiency through the use of a contractor is seen as a 
tradeoff against the loss of control that occurs. It seems possible, 
however, that if the product or service is properly specified and 
monitored, the inverse curve may be considerably flatter than one 
might expect at first glance. (Figure 2-5.)
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Figure 2-5 Increasing Efficiency of a Contract vs Increasing
Control of the Contract
One could speculate that the more complex a service is, the more 
prone it may be to loss of control. A janitorial contact is not
tremendously complex, and one would expect little loss of control. A
contract to evaluate and recommend clients for a social services 
agency is a great deal more complex, and one might reasonably
expect some loss of control over the evaluation and recommendation
process. The underlying cause of this relationship may be the 
increasing difficulty in properly specifying a complex product. (Fig 2- 
6 )
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F ig u re  2-6 Com plexity  of a Service or  P ro d u c t vs C ontro l of
a C o n tra c te d  Service o r  P ro d u c t
The Usefulness of Economic Analysis
Edwin Mills (1987) calls to question the usefulness of economic 
analysis in support of privatization. In reflecting upon studies that 
indicate some services are more economically produced by the 
private sector, Mills suggests the initial change to government 
production was the result of political decisions, not some analysis 
that showed government had a comparative advantage. He notes 
that both the public and private sector share the same problems of 
cost and demand uncertainty and asymmetrical information; there is 
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therefore no presumption of comparative advantage for the public 
sector. Further, Mills suggests that the correct issue in determining 
which sector should produce a good or services involves relative 
social efficiency or comparative advantage.
The Benefits of  Privatizing Production  
Cost savings
Potential cost savings is perhaps the major advantage of privatizing 
production. Studies reported in a wide variety of articles indicate 
savings can be realized by shifting production to the private sector. 
(Spann 1977)(Hanke 1985)(Moore 1987)(Florestano & Gordon 
1980)(Seader 1986) Hanke (1985), for instance, noted that a private 
wastewater operation typically had costs 20% to 50% less than a 
public wastewater operation. Savas (1987) in summarizing nine 
comparative studies of private and public residential waste 
collection, noted that the cost of public collection ranged from about 
the same to as much as 124% higher then private collection. Moore 
(1987) noted savings of 37% to 96% for contracted municipal services 
in summarizing a number of other comparative cost studies.
Evidence of this type clearly supports the notion that some 
contracted goods and services can result in cost savings.
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C ompetition
As noted previously, there is little incentive toward efficiency and 
cost control without competition. If monopolies both public and 
private are eliminated, competitive bidding for the production of 
goods and services in the marketplace should result in the lowest 
possible price, other things being equal.
F lexibility
Flexibility is seen as an advantage of contracting. (Sharkansky,
1980) Flexibility can be realized through the availability of multiple 
contractors, which when coupled with well specified contracts, 
permits rapid changes in the amount and character of services 
p ro v id ed .
Efficiency
One of the major benefits assumed with contracting is that the 
private sector is more efficient than the public sector. Whether this 
assumption is based upon fact is less certain. Pack (1987) suggests 
the "belief persists-even among public officials" that the private 
sector is more efficient than the public sector. Florestano and Gordon 
(1980) found that the public officials that responded to their survey 
viewed contracting as costing less and providing better service.
The Contracting Model
The model that supports many of the claimed benefits of contracting 
is this: "com peti t ive  bidding by profit-maximizing firms for a well
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specified output guarantees that the product will be produced at the 
lowest cost." (Pack 1989 - author’s italic) Elements of this model are 
reflected in topics discussed previously, such as the need for 
competitive bidding and a well specified contracts.
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Section III Statement of the Problem
Current literature suggests relationships between the degree of 
contracting by local governments, and the following variables: the
size of communities, the region of the country, the incentive to 
reduce costs, and the degree of employee unionization. (Ferris & 
Graddy 1986)(Poole & Fixler 1987)(Florestano & Gordon 1980)
Ferris and Graddy (1986) suggest, for example, that small 
communities would be be more likely to contract for services, 
because their small size leads to a lack of economies of scale. They 
also suggest that large communities would be more likely to contract 
out because a major metropolitan area would have more external 
options to choose from.
Florestano and Gordon (1980) found a similar relationship in their 
study. They also noted a relationship between the frequency of 
contracting and the region of the country, with the North Central 
region exhibiting a higher rate of contracting. Poole and Fixler 
(1987), on the other hand, note another study that suggests that local 
governments located on the western part of the country will be more 
likely to contract for services.
Ferris and Graddy also suggest that areas with a low proportion of 
public sector unions will experience greater contracting for services. 
Their reasoning is that a relatively strong union will be better able to 
prevent contracting, compared to a smaller, weaker union.
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The purpose of this project was to examine data from publicly 
funded colleges and universities to determine if contracting patterns 
similar to those noted above are observed. The following 
hypotheses were examined:
1) The amount of contracting will vary with the size of institution; 
specifically, small and large institutions should contract more 
than medium size institutions.
2 )  The amount contracting will vary with the region of the 
country, with one or more regions exhibiting a greater extent of 
con trac ting .
3 ) The amount of contracting will vary with the relative amount 
of unionization, with a inverse relationship between the degree 
of unionization and amount of contracting.
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Section IV Statement of Methods
I n tr o d u c t io n
This analytical portion of this project involved the analysis of data 
collected from colleges and universities throughout the United States. 
The data included information about the following variables:
1) Location of the institution
2) The size of the institution in terms of physical plant and student
b o d y
3) W hether the workforce is unionized
4) Whether contracting is used for over 25 different types of
service & maintenance/repair work
The source for these data was the 1986-87 International Experience  
Exchange Survey , conducted by The Association of Physical Plant 
Administrators of Universities and Colleges (APPA). APPA is, to 
quote their letterhead, "An association, international in scope, 
founded in 1914, whose purpose is to develop professional standards 
in the administration, care, operation, planning and development of 
physical plants used by colleges and universities. . . " The 
International Experience Exchange Survey is sent periodically to 
member institutions throughout the United States.
The first step in the analysis was to remove data about privately- 
funded institutions. The decision to remove private institutions was
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driven by the focus of this project upon public sector institutions, as 
well as a desire to keep the size of the data set manageable. It is 
recognized that privately-funded institutions may not differ from 
publicly funded institutions in terms of the amount of contracting 
undertaken, but that is not the focus of this study.
Data about institutions outside of the United States were also 
removed from the data set. It was reasoned that foreign institutions 
could be enough different so as to skew the data analysis. The 
remaining records were searched to remove any duplicate records 
that existed.
In the second step, an overall measure of the extent of contracting by 
each institution was developed, and the total, mean and standard 
deviation were calculated for each case. In addition, several data 
elements required transformation or consolidation, in order to 
provide the appropriate variables for analysis.
In the next step of the analysis, the measure of the extent of 
contracting for services, as a dependent variable, was tested against 
several independent variables. The independent variables included 
the following:
1) The size of the institution in terms of gross square footage,
divided into large, medium, and small institutions
2) The size of the institution in terms of enrollment categories,
divided into large, medium and small institutions.
3) The relative degree of unionization of the workforce
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4) The region of the country
Using Sys ta t  software on an Apple Macintosh , the data were 
analyzed by each of the independent variables, using the "Statistics"
mode. This procedure provided a count of the number of cases, the
mean, and standard deviation of the dependent variable.
In the final step of the data analysis, the means and standard 
deviations derived previously were compared by hypothesis testing 
procedures using the appropriate z score or t score. The results of 
this procedure indicated whether the means were statistically the 
same or different. The z and t scores were calculated on a Wi ngz  
spreadsheet on an Apple Macintosh.
Data Preparation
After the private, foreign, and duplicate entries were removed from 
the data set, 285 cases remained. Prior to data analysis, it was
necessary to develop several new data fields. These included a
regional designation, a building size index, a FTE index, and an 
overall measure of the extent of contracting for services.
R egional D es ignat ion
Region of the country was used as one of the independent variables 
in the analysis. A new data field was developed, in which the 
institutions were grouped into one of five regions, based upon the
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regional designations used by APPA. The regions are listed in Table 
4-1 and illustrated on Figure 4-1.
Eastern Midwest South­ Central R ocky Pacific
eastern Mountain Coast
Connecticut Illinois Alabama Arkansas Arizona Alaska
Delaware Indiana Florida Kansas Colorado California
District of Iowa Georgia Missouri Montana Hawaii
Columbia Michigan Kentucky Nebraska New Mexico Idaho
Maine M innesota Louisiana North Dakota Utah Nevada
Maryland Ohio Mississippi Oklahoma Wyoming Oregon
N ew  Hampshire W isconsin North Carolina South Dakota Washington
N ew  Jersey South Carolina T exas
N ew  York T en esee
Pennsylvania Virginia
Rhode Island W est Virginia
Vermont
Table 4-1 States by Region
Rocky Mountain
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Figure 4-1 Regional Designation
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Building Area Index
As an indication of the physical size of the institutions, a variable 
called BAIndex (Building Area Index) was developed. The building 
square footage figures were sorted, and graphed to display the 
frequency distribution of the square footage. It was determined to 
designate institutions below one million gross square feet as small 
institutions, those between one and three million gross square feet as 
medium, and those above three million gross square feet as large 
institutions. An examination of the distribution by size follows in 
Section V.
FTE Index
One of the existing data fields in the APPA data base was an 
indication of Full Time Equivalent enrollment (FTE). In the survey, 
the FTE ranges noted in Table 4-2 were used. In range 1 through 5, 
the FTE increased in increments of 1,000. In range 6 FTE the 
increment increases to 7,000, in range 7 to 10,000 and range 8 is 
20,000 and above. Because the increments were not equal, the 
survey FTE range codes were not used as variables. The FTE range 
scores were reconfigured into three groups: less than 5,000 FTE, 
between 5,000 and 11,999 FTE, and greater than 12,000 FTE. This 
consolidation resulted in three groups representing small, medium 
and large institutions.
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R ange FTE Code
0 -9 9 9 1
1 ,0 0 0 -1 ,9 9 9 2
2 ,0 0 0 -2 ,9 9 9 3
3 ,0 0 0 -3 ,9 9 9 4
4 ,0 0 0 -4 ,9 9 9 5
5 ,0 0 0 -1 1 ,9 9 9 6
1 2 ,0 0 0 -1 9 ,0 0 0 7
>20,000 8
Table 4-2 FTE Ranges in the APPA Survey
Measure of Overall Contracting
The final data field required was a measure of overall contracting.. 
The raw data from the survey provided information about the 
relative amount of contracting.for each institution for a wide variety 
of services. Twenty-six of these services were selected for this 
project. The raw data was originally coded so that 0=No/None; 1= In- 
house provision; 2=Mix of inhouse and contract, and 3= Fully 
contracted. Using this data, two measures of the relative amount of 
contracting were developed.
S u m m a r y  1
Summary 1 was developed by giving a 0 if the raw score was 0 or 1, 
or 1 if the raw score was 2 or 3. That is to say, if the service was not 
provided, or was provided in-house, the value assigned was 0; if the 
service was provided completely through contracting, or through a
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mix of contracting and in-house, a value of 1 was assigned. This new 
value for each of the twenty-six services was then totaled to yield 
Summary 1 for each of the 285 cases.
# Services














Table 4-3 Count and % of Summaryl Scores
The scores for Summaryl could range from 0 to 26; the observed 
range was from 1 to 13. The count of cases at each score and the 
corresponding percent are listed in Table 4-3 and plotted as a line 
graph in Figure 4-2 The plot is approximately bell-shaped, skewed 
to the right.
One of the significant advantages of Summaryl is that it directly 
provides information about the actual number of services being 
contracted for, fully or in part, by each of the 285 institutions. By
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totaling the Summaryl score for each of the 26 services, judgements 












Figure 4-2 Frequency Distribution of  Sum m ary l
S u m m a r y  2
The scores for Summary2 were constructed by transforming the raw 
data so that a score of 2 represented a mixture of contracting and in- 
house provision, and a score of 3 represented complete contracting. 
These scores ranging from 0 to 3 were then totaled for each of the 
285 cases to yield Summary2. The values could range from 0, for an
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Table 4-4______ Count and % of Summary2 Scores
institution that did not provide any of the 26 services, to 3x26, or 78, 
for an institution that provided all 26 services via contract. The 
actual values observed ranged from a low score of 17 to a high of 48. 
The count of cases for each score, and the corresponding percent are 
noted in Table 4-4. The count of scores and percent are shown as a
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Figure 4-3 Frequency Distribution of Summary2 Scores
line graph in Figure 4-3. The data produce a jagged but roughly bell­
shaped curve. One problem with the scores derived from Summary2 
is that the total score for each case doesn't necessarily provide 
significant information about the institution. For example, a score of 
30 could mean that 10 services are fully contracted, and the 
remaining 16 not provided at all. A score of 30 could also represent 
22 services provided in-house, with 4 more provided with a mix of 
in-house and contracted service. This ambiguity led to a decision to 
use Summaryl for the rest of the analysis.
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Section V Data Analysis Results
Composition of the Data Set
One of the first steps in the data analysis was an examination of the 
various elements of the data set. This step provided information 
about the composition of the institutions in terms of the regional 
composition, size, and the extent of contracting.
Regional C omposit ion
Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1 provide information about the distribution 
of institutions by region. Table 5-1 lists the count of institutions in 
each region, as well as the percentage. Figure 5-1 illustrates this 
distribution as a line graph. The largest concentration of institutions 
in the data set was in the Central region; the smallest concentration 






Rocky Mountain 26.00 9.10
Pacific Coast 38.00 13.30
Table 5-1______ Count and % of Institutions in Each Region
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Eastern Midwest Southeastern Central Rocky Mnt. Pacific Coast
Figure 5-1 Distribution of Institutions by Region  
Building Area as a Measure of Size
The count and percent of institutions in each building area category 
are listed in Table 5-2, and shown graphically in Figure 5-2. Twelve 
institutions, or 4.2% of the cases, did not indicate their gross square 
footage.
BAIndex Count %
< 1 Million 112.00 41.03
>1 Million & < 3 Million 97.00 35.53
> 3 Million 64.00 23.44
Note: 12 cases were missing data, and are not reflected
above.
Table 5-2 Count and % of Institutions in BAIndex
Page 56
| Privatization in Higher Education: Contracting for Services
112 institutions, or 41.0% of the remaining 273 cases, fell into the 
small institution category, while 97 cases (35.5%) ranked as medium 








> 3 Million>1 Million & < 3 Million< 1 Million
Figure 5-2 Frequency Distribution for BAIndex
FTE as a Measure of Size
The distribution of institutions within the three FTEIndex groups is 
noted in Table 5-3. The distribution is expressed as a line graph in 
Figure 5-3. The largest number of institutions were in the <5,000 
range at 118 or 41.40% of the total. The Medium size range included 
89 institutions, or 31.23 % of the total, with the remaining 78 
institutions (27.37%) in the large category.
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Figure 5-3 Distribution of FTEIndex by Count and %
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Extent of  Contracting
The extent of contracting for the various services was examined, as 
part of the data analysis. The scores (1 or 0) for each service 
category were totaled. This quickly provided a count of the number 
of institutions that contracted to provide a particular service. The 
counts were than converted to percents. These are listed in Table 5- 
4. The distribution of percentages of institutions that contracted is 
illustrated as a line graph in Figure 5-4.
A brief review of the data in Table 5-4 provides some Interesting 
insights. Somewhat surprisingly, some eight services were not 
contracted for by any of the 285 institutions. Only one institution 
contracted for security services, and one for utility maintenance.
Two institutions contracted for pest control, and three for walk and 
street maintenance. After those services, the numbers begin to 
increase .
The top three services to be contracted for are not too surprising. 
Roof replacement was contracted for by 270 of the 285 institutions 
(94.74%). In second place was elevator maintenance, with 250 
institutions (87.72%) contracting. Trash removal was a distant third 
with 184 institutions (64.56%).
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Service # That Contract % that Contract
Athletic Facilities 0 0.00%
Labor Pool 0 0.00%
Mail Delivery 0 0.00%
Minor Construction 0 0.00%
Moving/Deliver 0 0.00%
Stu Union/Food Service 0 0.00%
Student Housing 0 0.00%
T rades 0 0.00%
Security 1 0.35%
Utility M aintenance 1 0.35%
P est Control 2 0.70%
Roads/W alks 3 1.05%
Filter Replacem ent 15 5.26%
Grounds 18 6.32%
HVAC M aintenance 23 8.07%
Cool Tower Maint 26 9.12%
Custodial 49 17.19%
Water Treatment 69 24.21%
Exterior Painting 82 28.77%
Chiller M aintenance 95 33.33%
Roof M aintenance 98 34.39%
Exter Bldg Cleaning 137 48.07%
Masonry Repairs 142 49.82%
Trash Removal 184 64.56%
Elevator Maintenance 250 87.72%
Roof R eplacem ent 270 94.74%
Table 5-4 Number and % of Institutions That
Contracted for Services
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Figure 5-4 Percent of  Institutions Contracting For Services
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Hypothesis Testing Results
BAIndex as the Independent Variable
The mean scores for Summaryl, sorted by BAIndex code were as 
follows:
Baindex Code Sum m aryl Mean
1 Small Institutions 5 .411
2 Medium Institutions 5 .5 3 6
3. Large Institutions 4 .1 8 8
Table 5-5 Summaryl Mean Scores by BAIndex
Using z scores, paired means were tested at the .05 level to 
determine if the means were statistically the same. The null 
hypothesis was that the means were statistically the same , that is, 
that variance in the means was the result of chance. The null 
hypothesis was rejected if the z score fell outside of the critical value. 
The critical value of z at the .05 level of significance was +. 1.96 for 
this two-tailed test. (Mason, Lind & Marchal, 1983). Rejection of the 
null hypothesis would indicate that the means were in fact 
statistically different, and not the result of chance.
The results of the hypothesis testing indicated that the Summaryl 
means for small and medium institutions were statistically the same. 
The mean for large institutions was not the same as the other two.
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P air z Score Critical Value (a) .05 Null Hypothesis
1 & 2 -0 .401 ±  1.96 A ccep ted
1 & 3 3.953 ±  1.96 R ejected
2 & 3 4.146 ±. 1.96 Rejected
Table 5-6 z Scores for Paired  M eans of 
B A l n d e x
S u m m a ry l  by
The mean for the Summaryl score for large institutions was smaller 
than the means for medium and small institutions, indicating that, 
using BAIndex as the independent variable, large institutions 
contracted for services to a lesser extent.
F T E In d e x  as the  In d e p e n d e n t  V ariab le
FTEIndex was the second measure of institute size. The mean scores 
for Sum m aryl, sorted by BAIndex code were as follows:
FTEIndex Code Summaryl Mean
1 Small Institutions 5 .3 9 0
2 Medium Institutions 5 .337
3. Large Institutions 4.551
T ab le  5-7 S u m m ary l  M ean Scores by F T E Index
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The paired means were tested as above. The results are noted in 
Table 5-8.
Pair z Score Critical Value (a) .05 Null HvDothesis
1 & 2 0.171 ±  1.96 A ccep ted
1 & 3 2 .6 6 4 ±. 1.96 Rejected
2 & 3 2 .433 ±  1.96 Rejected
Table 5-8 z Scores fo r  P a ired  M eans of S u m m a ry l  by
F T E I n d e x
The results of the hypothesis testing indicated that the Summaryl 
means for small and medium institutions were statistically the same 
for this measure of institution size.. The mean for large institutions 
were not the same as the other two. The mean for the Summaryl 
score for large institutions was smaller than the means for medium 
and small institutions, indicating that, using FTEIndex as the 
independent variable, large institutions contracted for services to a 
lesser extent.than small and medium sized institutions.
E M P T Y P E  as the  In d e p e n d e n t  V ariab le
EMPTYPE was used as a relative measure of unionization. The mean 
scores for Summaryl, sorted by EMPTYPE, are listed in Table 5-9.
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EMPTYPE Code Sum m aryl Mean
1 Non-Union Employees 5 .196
2 Mixed 5 .1 0 0
3. Union Employees 5 .193
T able  5-9 S u m m ary l  M ean Scores by E M PT Y PE
The paired means were also tested as above. The results are noted 
in Table 5-10.
P air z Score Critical Value (a) .05 Null Hvpothesis
1 & 2 0 .2 9 6 ±  1.96 A ccep ted
1 & 3 0 .0 0 8 ±  1.96 A ccep ted
2 & 3 -0.314 ±  1.96 A ccep ted
T able  5-10 z  Scores for P aired  M eans of S u m m a ry l  by
EMPTYPE
The results of the hypothesis testing indicated that the Summaryl 
means were statistically the same for all three pairs. Variances in 
Summaryl were not the result of differing degrees of unionization. 
This indicated that, using EMPTYPE as the independent variable, the 
extent of contracting for services observed was not the result of 
variations in the relative degree of unionization.
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REGION as the Independent Variable
The mean scores for Summaryl, sorted by REGION, are listed in Table 
5-11. In this case, the paired means were submitted to a t test, 
because one of the regions had less than thirty cases. The results 
are noted in Table 5-12. The null hypothesis was was once again 
that the means were statistically the same , that is, that variance in 
the means was the result of chance. The null hypothesis was 
rejected if the t score fell outside of the critical value. The critical 
value of t for this
REGION Code Sum m aryl Mean
1 Eastern 5 .6 5 2
2 Midwest 5 .945
3. Southeastern 4 .965
4. Central 4 .7 9 4
5. Rocky Mountain 4 .115
6. Pacific Coast 4 .921
Table 5-11 Summaryl Mean Scores by REGION
two-tailed test at the .05 level of significance varies with the degrees 
of freedom. (Mason, Lind & Marchal, 1983). Rejection of the null 
hypothesis would indicate that the means were in fact statistically 
different, and not the result of chance.
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The results of the hypothesis testing were somewhat mixed. The 
hypothesis was rejected for Pair 1 & 5 (Eastern and Rocky Mountain). 
The hypothesis was also rejected for pairs 2 & 3, 2 & 4, 2 & 5 and 2 
& 6 (Midwest, Southeastern, Central, Rocky Mountain, and Pacific
P air t Score Critical Value (a) .05 Null Hypothesis
1 & 2 -0.607 ± 1.982 A ccep ted
1 & 3 1 .467 ± 1.982 A ccep ted
1 & 4 1 .912 ± 1.981 A ccep ted
1 & 5 2 .611 ± 1.994 Rejected
1 & 6 1.371 ± 1.989 A ccep ted
2 & 3 2 .437 ± 1.981 Rejected
2 & 4 3 .013 ±. 1.982 R ejected
2 & 5 3 .777 ±. 1.989 R ejected
2 & 6 2 .288 ± 1.986 Rejected
3 & 4 0 .458 ± 1.982 A ccep ted
3 & 5 1.815 ±. 1.989 A ccep ted
3 & 6 0.101 ± 1.986 A ccepted
4 & 5 1.512 ± 1.986 A ccep ted
4 & 6 -0.306 ± 1.982 A ccep ted
5 & 6 -1.418 ± 2.000 A ccepted
Table 5-12 t Scores for Paired Means of Summaryl by
REGION
Coast). This indicated that for Summarvl means sorted_by REGION, 
the Eastern region contracted for services to a greater extend than
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the Rocky Mountain region, and the Midwest Region contracted for 
services, to a greater extent than the Southwestern. Central. Rocky 
Mountain and Pacific Coast regions. The differences in means 
between the Eastern and Midwest regions was not statistically 
s ignificant.
Service Category by FTEIndex
To provide an additional view of the affect of size upon the extent of 
contracting, The services listed in Table 5-4 were sorted by 
FTEIndex, the number of institutions contracting the particular 
service were totaled and the means calculated. The paired means for 
the small, medium, and large institutions were subjected to a 
hypothesis testing procedure using the z score as noted above. The 
null hypothesis remains the same as before. The critical value of z 
for the two-tailed test was again +. 1.96. The means are listed in 
Table 5-12. The z scores and results of the hypothesis tests are 
noted in Table 5-13.
As might be expected, at this micro level the results begin to deviate 
somewhat from those seen above. Services with clear variations 
include HVAC m aintenance, which small institutions contract for 
more frequently, chiller maintenance and masonry repairs, which
large institutions contract for less frequently, and roof replacement,
which medium institutions contract for more frequently than small 
or large institutions. While the results for HVAC maintenance, chiller 
maintenance and masonry repairs are not unexpected, this result for
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roof replacement seemed anomalous, and would bear further 
in v es tig a tio n .
Service Category Institute Size
Small M ed ium L arge
Athletic Facilities 0 .00 0 .00 0 .0 0
Labor Pool 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00
Mail Delivery 0 .00 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Minor Construction 0 .00 0 .0 0 0 .00
M o v in g /D e liv e ry 0 .0 0 0 .00 0 .00
Stu Union/Food Serve 0 .0 0 0 .00 0 .0 0
Student Housing 0 .0 0 0 .00 0 .00
T ra d e s 0 .0 0 0 .00 0 .00
S ecu rity 0.01 0 .00 0 .00
Utility Maintenance 0 .00 0 .00 0.01
Pest Control 0 .02 0 .00 0 .00
Roads/W alks Maint 0 .02 0 .00 0.01
Filter Replacement 0 .05 0 .07 0 .04
G rounds 0 .06 0 .08 0.05
HVAC Maintenance 0 .14 0 .04 0 .04
Cool Tower Maint 0.11 0 .09 0.06
Custodial 0 .14 0 .15 0 .24
W ater T reatm ent 0.25 0 .26 0.21
Exterior Painting 0 .30 0.25 0 .32
Chiller Maintenance 0 .39 0 .36 0 .22
Roof Maintenance 0 .42 0.35 0 .22
Exterior Bldg Cleaning 0 .42 0.57 0.47
Masonry Repairs 0 .5 4 0.55 0.37
Trash Removal 0 .69 0 .66 0 .56
Elevator M aintenance 0.91 0 .90 0.81
Roof Replacement 0.93 1.00 0.91
Table 5-12 Means for Service Categories, By FTEIndex
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Service Catesorv Pair 1&2 Pair 1&3 Pair ?A3
Athletic Facilities 0.00 A ccep ted 0.00 A c c e p te d 0.00 A ccep ted
Labor Pool 0.00 A ccep ted 0.00 A c c e p te d 0.00 A c c e p te d
Mail Delivery 0.00 A ccep ted 0.00 A c c e p te d 0.00 A ccep ted
Minor Constructio 0.00 A ccep ted 0.00 A c c e p te d 0.00 A ccep ted
M oving /D e l ivery 0.00 A ccep ted 0.00 A c c e p te d 0.00 A ccep ted
Stu Union/Food Service 0.00 A ccep ted 0.00 A c c e p te d 0.00 A ccep ted
Student Housing 0.00 A ccep ted 0.00 A c c e p te d 0.00 A ccep ted
Trades 0.00 A ccepted 0.00 A ccep ted 0.00 A ccep ted
Security 1.21 A ccepted 1.21 A ccep ted 0.00 A ccep ted
Utility Maintenance 0.00 Accepted -0.80 Accepted -0.80 A ccep ted
Pest Control 1.67 A ccep ted 1.67 A c c e p te d 0.00 A ccep ted
Roads/Walks Maint 1.67 A ccepted 0.58 Accepted -0.80 A ccep ted
Filter Replacement -0.60 A ccep ted 0.34 A ccep ted 0.88 A ccep ted
Grounds -0.55 A ccepted 0.30 A ccep ted 0.79 A c c e p te d
HVAC Maintenance 2.60 Rejected 2.63 R ejec ted 0.00 A c c e p te d
Cool Tower Maint 0.48 A ccep ted 1.24 A ccep ted 0.72 A ccep ted
Custodial -0.20 Accepted -1.71 Accepted -1.45 A ccep ted
Water Treatment 0.80 Accepted -0.29 Accepted -1.00 A ccep ted
Chiller Maintenance 0.44 A ccepted 2.59 R ejec ted 2.01 R ejected
R oof  Maintenance 1.02 A ccepted 3.02 R ejec ted 1.87 A ccep ted
Exterior Bldg Cleaning -2.16 Rejected -0.69 A ccep ted 1.29 A ccep ted
Masonry Repairs -0.14 A ccepted 2.36 R ejec ted 2.35 R ejec ted
Trash Removal 0.45 A ccep ted 1.82 A ccep ted 1.31 A ccep ted
Elevator Maintenance 0.24 A ccep ted 1.90 R ejec ted 1.63 A ccep ted
R oof  Replacement -3.04 R eiec ted 0.50 A ccen ted 2.74 R e iec ted
Table 5-13 z Scores for Paired Means of Service Category  
______ Scores by FTEIndex______________________
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Section VI Summary and Conclusions
S u m m a r y
The intent of the analytical section of this project was to examine 
data about contracting for services by public colleges and 
universities, in order to test the following hypotheses:
1) The amount of contracting will vary with the size of institution; 
specifically, small and large institutions should contract more 
than medium size institutions.
2)  The amount contracting will vary with the region of the 
co u n try .
3)  The amount of contracting will vary with the relative amount 
of unionization, with a negative relationship between the 
degree of unionization and amount of contracting.
Hypothesis 1 Contracting and Institute Size
Hypothesis 1 held that large and small institutions would contract 
more than medium size institutions. This assertion was examined by 
submitting the means of the overall contracting statistic, Summaryl, 
to a hypothesis testing procedure using z scores. Two series of tests 
were run, sorting the Summaryl scores by FTEIndex and BAIndex, 
and than calculating the means, after which z scores were calculated
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and compared to the critical value of z at the .05 level of 
significance.
The results of both test procedures indicate that large institutions 
contract for services to a lesser extent than do small and medium 
size institutions. Small and medium size institutions contract for 
services at the same rate. Based upon these findings, Hypothesis 1 is 
not supported.
The most likely explanation for this result is the economy of scale 
that large institutions enjoy, compared to medium and small 
institutions. The University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, for instance, has 
a sufficient number of elevators to make it economical to directly 
employ elevator mechanics.
Hypothesis 2 Contracting and Region of 
the Country
Hypothesis 2 held that the extent of contracting would vary by 
region throughout the country. To test this assertion, Summaryl 
scores were sorted by region, and the means of Summaryl calculated 
for each region. These means were than submitted to a hypothesis 
testing procedure using t scores, at the .05 level of significance. The 
results of the testing procedure indicate that the Eastern region 
contracted for services to a greater extend than the Rocky Mountain 
region, and the Midwest Region contracted for services to a greater 
extent than did the Southwestern, Central, Rocky Mountain and
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Pacific Coast regions. Based upon this result, Hypothesis 2 is 
su p p o r te d .
No clear explanation presents itself for this result; it could be 
speculated, however, that relative population and manufacturing 
concentrations may have some influence on the number of 
contractors available to provide services.
Hypothesis 3 The Extent of Contracting and 
Degree of Unionism
Hypothesis 3 asserted that the amount of contracting will vary with 
the relative amount of unionization, with a inverse relationship 
between the degree of unionization and amount of contracting. That 
is to say, as the relative degree of unionization increases, the extent 
of contracting should decrease. This assertion was test by sorting the 
Summary 1 scores by relative degree of unionization scores, 
calculating the means for each of the three categories, and submitting 
these means to a hypothesis testing procedure using z scores at the 
.05 level of significance. The results indicate no statistically 
significant difference in the extent of contracting for services 
between institutions with non-union, mixed, or union workforces. 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
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The Extent of Contracting for Services
A brief review of the extent of contracting for services is of interest. 
For the 285 cases in this study, the mean number of services 
contracted for is 5.144 of the possible 26 services (19.78%). The 
minimum number contracted for was one, and the maximum 13. The 
standard deviation was 2.207.
Of the 26 services, 8 were not contracted for at all, and another 4 
were contracted out by 3 or less institutions. The 3 services most 
contracted for, trash removal, elevator maintenance, and roof 
replacement, are not surprizing to this writer, and are the services 
most facilities managers would place on a "most likely to contract" 
list.
Suggestions for Future Study
Further study on this topic could follow several courses. A 
replication of this study could be undertaken after APPA's next 
collection of data. Some refinements in the data gathered would be 
of benefit to future research, particularly more specific information 
about the extent of unionism, FTE enrollment, and the extent 
particular services are contracted for. Cost data for inhouse and 
contract provision of services would also be of interest. A second 
possibility for research would be a comparison of the extent of 
contracting between public and private institutions.
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